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THE ESPIONAGE ACT AND TODAY'S "HIGH-TECH TERRORIST"
Jamie L. Hester*
Throughout the twentieth century courts interpreted the Espionage
Act of 1917 to criminalize leaking classified information, but
consciously refused to extend the Act to prohibit press institutions
from subsequently publishing leaked information. While the
United States government has a significant interest in preventing
dissemination of sensitive information, the courts allow news
organizations to claim First Amendment protection to foster
government transparency and public disclosure. The prolferation
of digital media, highlighted by the recent exposure of WikiLeaks
founder Julian Assange, presents an additional challenge to refine
characteristics of press institutions to determine if online news
organizations will qualiy for the same First Amendment
protections. Beyond the potential prosecution of Assange in
American courts, both Houses of Congress are considering the
SHIELD Act, a bill that would broaden the statutory language of
the Espionage Act and facilitate targeting of publishers of
classified information.
I. INTRODUCTION
The reach of the United States' criminal authority in the
international sphere has roots in the Espionage Act of 1917'
("Act"). Since its inception the U.S. government has used the Act
to pursue and prosecute American citizens, and later foreign
nationals, acting against the interests of the United States' national
security.2 Provisions of the Act were first used to criminalize
sharing sensitive information with foreign governments, but later
the U.S. government used the Act to prosecute leaks to the press
J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2012.
'18 U.S.C. §§ 792-798 (2006).
2 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971);
United States v. Zehe, 601 F. Supp. 196 (D. Mass. 1985).
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and attempted to target the media publishing such leaked
information. The recent arrest of WikiLeaks4 founder Julian
Assange in Great Britain, after he led efforts to release secret
cables and documents from the United States military and foreign
service, has raised the possibility that the United States might seek
his extradition to prosecute him for espionage.! Under the
Espionage Act, acquiring and transmitting classified United States
intelligence are crimes, though the Supreme Court has recognized
safe havens for the press and publishers to protect the rights
enshrined in the First Amendment.' It is not clear if the current
interpretation of the Act would give exception to Assange's
publication if the U.S. government prosecuted him under the Act
since his role as WikiLeaks founder and leader could be viewed as
outside the scope of a traditional journalist. With Assange's
potentially illegal acts of espionage playing out on a digital stage,
technology has serious implications for defining the role of a
journalist.
Anticipating the lack of clarity, U.S. legislators recently
introduced legislation in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate to broaden the definition and scope of espionage,
encompassing not only the leaking of classified information but
also the publication of such data.7 Passage of the Securing Human
3 See Jereen Trudell, The Constitutionality ofSection 793 of the Espionage Act
and Its Application to Press Leaks, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 205, 210-14 (1986)
(citing United States v. Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655 (D. Md. 1985) (describing
the history of application of the Act to the press, focusing on United States v.
Morison, in which the District Court of Maryland concluded that there is no
immunity from the Espionage Act for those who leak information to
journalists)).
4 WKILEAKS, http://213.251.145.96/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
Peter Grier, Julian Assange: Extradition to Sweden just a stop en route to
US?, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/2011/0224/Julian-Assange-Extradition-to-Sweden-just-a-stop-en-route-to-
US.
See Trudell, supra note 3.
7 See S. 4004, 111th Cong. (2010) (amending § 798 of title 18 of the United
States Code, a provision of the Espionage Act); H.R. 6506, 111th Cong. (2010)
(same); see also S. 315, 112th Cong. (2011) (reintroducing the SHIELD Act
amendment in the current Congress); H.R. 703, 112th Cong. (2011) (same).
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Intelligence and Enforcing Lawful Dissemination ("SHIELD") Act
would make successful conviction more likely. However, it would
also throw the current balance between illegal espionage and
investigative journalism, a line both the Supreme Court and lower
courts have drawn between national security interests and freedom
of the press, into dangerous disarray.
In Part II, this Recent Development will examine the
Espionage Act's text and its treatment in American courts during
the twentieth century, including application not only to American
citizens located domestically and abroad, but also to foreign
nationals allegedly acting against U.S. national security interests.
This paper will grant particular attention to espionage cases in
which freedom of the press colored the courts' opinions. In Part
III, this Recent Development will examine the controversy
surrounding WikiLeaks and its founder Julian Assange as an
illustration of the tangled web technology has woven for applying
the ambiguous provisions of the Act to online media organizations.
However, as Part III will highlight, the recently introduced
SHIELD Act purports to clarify some of those existing ambiguities
and broaden the types of espionage criminalized by the Espionage
Act, a move that indicates the direction of not only the judiciary
but also the U.S. Congress. This Recent Development will
conclude by recognizing the uncertain distinction of Assange as a
journalist and propose that with the current interpretations of
protections for media organizations he could evade conviction.
II. THE ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1917
A. Statutory Language
The Espionage Act of 1917 was passed during wartime to
target individuals working against the interests of American
8 The Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 792-798 (2006). For a detailed recitation
of the legislative history and statutory language of the Espionage Act, now
codified in §§ 792-798, see generally Harold Edgar and Benno C. Schmidt, Jr.,
The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L.
REV. 929 (1973). The article was published soon after the Supreme Court case
of New York Times v. United States in the early 1970's, but its thorough
explication of the legislative intent is still applicable.
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national security.' For purposes of this Recent Development, the
"Act" refers to §§ 792-798 of Title 18 of the United States Code,
though certain provisions of § 79310 and § 798" are the most
applicable to the taking, transmission, and dissemination of
documents that threaten U.S. national security. Section 793(b)
specifically prohibits copying, taking, or obtaining documents
"connected with the national defense," or attempting to do any of
the above, "for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the
national defense with intent or reason to believe that the
information is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the
advantage of any foreign nation."12 In § 793(c), reception of such
information, with the same intent as in subsection (b), is a criminal
act.13  Section 793(e) criminalizes willful communication and
transmission of information by any person having "unauthorized
possession of access to or control over" documents and
information "relating to the national defense."l4 These three
subsections are particularly applicable to actions of leakers of
information and also could include the actions of publishers.
In contrast, § 798(a), added to the Act in 1951, states:
Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates furnishes transmits or
otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person or publishes or
uses in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United
States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of
9 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech and National Security, 84 IND. L.J. 939,
944-46 (2009) (providing an analysis of the background of the Espionage Act
and free speech). Professor Stone points out that the Espionage Act was initially
used with fervor when applied to war dissenters, through the beginning of World
War II. Id.
'0 18 U.S.C. § 793 (criminalizing the gathering, transmitting, or losing of
defense information with the purpose of injuring the United States or providing
advantage to a foreign government, including conspiracy or attempt to do the
same).
" Id. § 798 (criminalizing the disclosure of classified information if
detrimental to the security of the United States, specifically including the
publishing of such information).
12 Id. § 793.
" Id.
14
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the United States [specific types of classified information will be
criminally liable]. 5
Such classified information, as the law currently reads, relates
specifically to use of codes, ciphers, communication intelligence
activities, or obtained through communication intelligence
activities of foreign governments." While § 793 has a broad
conception of classified information (such that it is related or
connected to national defense), the more recently formulated § 798
has a lower threshold for intent (such that it is detrimental to the
interests of the United States) and specifically mentions
publishing.
Under the Espionage Act, the United States criminalizes acts of
espionage by American citizens inside and outside U.S. borders
and acts of espionage by foreign nationals that occur within the
United States. Recently, courts have interpreted the Act even more
liberally, allowing the prosecution of foreign nationals outside the
jurisdiction of the United States proper." Thus, the United States
has not limited its jurisdiction by geographic location or nationality
of the suspected criminal, but instead has focused on the nature of
the act itself since the act is the source of the harm to national
security interests.
A. Application and Interpretation
1. Criminalizing Publication
The U.S. government's first significant use of the Act occurred
in 1919 when used against American citizens who passed out
leaflets that derided conscription and compared it to slavery."
Finding that there was a sufficiently clear and present danger in
publishing the information to uphold the defendants' convictions,
the Supreme Court said that the Espionage Act did allow
prosecution of such behavior, despite First Amendment concerns
and the abrogation of free speech.1 9
" Id. § 798.
16id
1 See United States v. Zehe, 601 F. Supp. 196, 197 (D. Mass. 1985).
8 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 49-50 (1919).
19 Id. at 52.
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The Espionage Act was used perhaps most famously in the
1970's to stop the publication of the Pentagon Papers in The New
York Times and The Washington Post.20 The so-called "Pentagon
Papers" "consisted of forty-seven volumes totalling [sic] 7,000
pages containing 2.5 million words,"21 published by The New York
Times in a series of excerpts in 1971.22 These papers documented
the United States' extensive involvement in Southeast Asia in the
1960's, information some government officials viewed as harmful
to U.S. security interests, sufficient to require the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York to order an injunction
against publication.2 3 The Supreme Court determined that the U.S.
government had not met its burden to continue the injunction
against The New York Times and The Washington Post, but made
no definite ruling on the application of the Espionage Act to the
papers' publications after the fact.24  However, Justice Douglas
wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Black, in which he
explicitly recognized that if the government had invoked the
Espionage Act statutes in their arguments to uphold the injunction,
the specific inclusion of "publishes" versus "communicates" in
various subsections of § 794, § 797, and § 798 showed
Congressional intent to "distinguish between publishing and
communication in the various sections of the Espionage Act." 25 At
trial, the U.S. government had indeed used § 793(e) to support its
injunction against The New York Times, but the District Court of
New York firmly rejected the government's contention that
prohibitions against communication of sensitive information
20 See Melville B. Nimmer, National Security Secrets v. Free Speech: The
Issues Left Undecided in the Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REV. 311, 312-13
(1974) (describing the facts of New York Times Co. v. United States as well as
the background of the U.S. case against the individuals accused of procuring the
classified documents, Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo, in United States v.
Russo).
21 John Cary Sims, Triangulating the Boundaries of Pentagon Papers, 2 WM.
& MARY BILL RTs. J. 341, 357 (1993).
22 Id. at 355-57 (1993). The article notes that The New York Times was
enjoined from publishing the documents for a brief period in June. Id. at 355.
23 id.
24 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714-15 (1971).
25 Id. at 720 22 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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covered publication by a newspaper, once information was already
leaked.26 In reference to § 793(e), the District Court held that
"what is prohibited is the secret or clandestine communication to a
person not entitled to receive it" while "in other sections of
Chapter 37 [including §§ 794 and 798] there is specific reference
to publication."27 The U.S. government opted not to use the
Espionage Act at the appellate level, so the Supreme Court did not
rule on the question of application of the Espionage Act to
newspaper publishers.28
The next significant case in which sharing classified military
documents with members of the press presented a central question
for the courts was United States v. Morison.29 In Morison, an
analyst at the Naval Intelligence Support Center took classified
pictures and transmitted them to an editor of a British magazine,
for whom Morison also worked."o The Fourth Circuit ruled that
Morison had violated § 793(d) of the Espionage Act, but only
because he was a government official who shared sensitive
military photographs with the press.31 The court avoided a ruling
on exactly how the Espionage Act could be used to prosecute
journalists, and it did not consider Morison's employment as a
journalist of the magazine as a factor relevant to his liability.32
In a concurring opinion, Judge Wilkinson recognized that the
majority opinion failed to fully appreciate the balancing act
between freedom of the press and national security interests.33 He
emphasized that freedom of the press is vital to a functioning
democratic government and drew the court's attention to The
Washington Post's amicus curiae brief as emblematic of the
26 United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 328 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
27 d
28New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714.
29 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988).
0 id. at 1060-61.
31 Id. at 1070.
32 Laura Barandes, A Helping Hand: Addressing New Implications of the
Espionage Act on Freedom of the Press, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 371, 394 (2007).
33 Morison, 844 F.2d at 1084 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
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benefits of a free press. 34 A decision against Morison, the Post
cautioned and Wilkinson reiterated, would "affect and perhaps
dramatically alter the way in which government officials deal with
the press the way in which the press gathers and reports the news
and the way in which the public learns about its government" 5
Wilkinson lamented that even in the face of national security
concerns, "[c]riminal restraints on the disclosure of information
threaten the ability of the press to scrutinize and report on
government activity.... We have placed our faith in knowledge,
not in ignorance, and for most, this means reliance on the press."36
Judge Wilkinson noted that "investigative reporting is a critical
component of the First Amendment's goal of accountability in
government. To stifle it might leave the public interest prey to the
manifold abuses of unexamined power."37 Although the court did
not afford Morison any First Amendment protections against
prosecution under the Espionage Act, the concurring opinion
recognized the weighty significance of freedom of the press even
in the face of national security threats.
As illustrated above, United States courts have recognized a
distinction between the leaking of sensitive military information to
journalists and the publication of the same by press institutions.
As of this writing, the U.S. government has yet to successfully
convict a journalist or media organization for publishing classified
information.38 Members of the Executive Branch, however, have
34 Id. at 1080-81.
3 Id. (quoting Brief for Washington Post et al. as Amici Curiae, United States
v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (1988)). Judge Wilkinson also quoted James
Madison to emphasize society's interest in promoting civic discourse and access
to government information: "'A popular Government, without popular
information, or a means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a
Tragedy; or, perhaps both."' Id. at 1081 (quoting 9 JAMES M\IADISON, THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES M\IADISON COMPRISING His PUBLIC PAPERS AND His
PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE, INCLUDING NUMEROUS LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS
Now FOR THE FIRST TIME PRINTED 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910)).
361id.
37
38 Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by
WikiLeaks: Hearing on H.R. 6506 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
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suggested that such convictions are not out of the question.39 In
2006, when discussing an ongoing espionage case against two
lobbyists working for the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee,40 then Attorney General Alberto Gonzales hinted that,
like the two lobbyists, The New York Times could be criminally
liable for publication of classified documents.4 1 Fellow Justice
Department officials later confirmed that the Attorney General's
comments referred to applying the text of the Espionage Act
specifically to journalists.4 2 Although the Supreme Court has yet
to rule on the precise scope of protections afforded media
organizations, courts have respected a significant degree of
protection for journalists that publish already leaked information as
compared to those individuals who illegally acquire and leak
classified documents.43
2. Espionage Act as Applied to Foreign Nationals
In 1985, the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts ruled that the Espionage Act did more than
criminalize the leaking of classified information by American
citizens.44 United States v. Zehe45 held that the Act provided the
United States authority to criminalize and prosecute acts of foreign
nationals in foreign jurisdictions as well.46 The court did not
interpret the scope of the Espionage Act as only targeting
Americans, but instead viewed it as a broad protective measure
Cong. 39 (2010) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein,
Partner, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP).
39 Derigan A. Silver, National Security and the Press: The Government's
Ability to Prosecute Journalists for the Possession or Publication of National
Security Information, 13 CoMM. L. & POLY 447, 448-449 (2008).
40 See Jonathon H. Adler & Michael Berry, A Troubling Prosecution, NAT'L
REv. ONLINE (Aug. 21, 2006), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/218521/
troubling-prosecution/jonathan-h-adler (describing the First Amendment and
freedom of the press concerns in light of the case United States v. Rosen).
41 Silver, supra note 39.
4 2 Id. at 449.
43 Hearing, supra note 38, at 17 (statement of Geoffrey R. Stone, Professor
and former Dean, University of Chicago Law School).
44 United States v. Zehe, 601 F. Supp. 196 (D. Mass. 1985).
45 id.
46 Id. at 198.
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that criminalized certain acts contrary to the interests of the United
States.4 7 The court held that the invocation of the Espionage Act
depends on the nature of the act rather than the person who
committed the act, since the action threatens the national security
of the United States.4 8 The Zehe court relied on precedent when it
observed that previous "courts expressly relied upon the nature of
the offenses, and not just upon the citizenship of the defendants."49
The defendant, who was a German, argued that the Act was not
meant to apply to "noncitizens acting entirely outside of the United
States.""o Furthermore, "in order to apply a criminal statute to acts
committed by noncitizens beyond this country's territorial
boundaries, there must be a strong and clear showing of
congressional intent.""1 The court rejected the defendant's
argument with a textualist construction; the Act said nothing about
applying only to American citizens or, more importantly here, to
acts that occurred within the country's territories.52
Given courts' decisions to apply the Espionage Act based on
the offense regardless of the status of the person who committed it,
individuals suspected of espionage cannot find refuge in foreign
jurisdictions. Therefore, any attempts to prosecute individuals
4 7 Id. at 197.
48 Id.
49 The previous decisions referred to in the Zehe case are United States v.
Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (U.S. 1922); United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th
Cir. 1973); and United States v. Birch, 470 F.2d 808 (4th Cir. 1972). According
to the Zehe court, all three cases held that criminal offenses against the U.S.
government depended on the offense itself, not the source of the offense, such as
a noncitizen. Zehe, 601 F. Supp. at 197.
'o Id. at 198.
5i Id.
52 Id. The Espionage Act states that "whoever knowingly and willfully
communicates ... to an unauthorized person" the classified information should
be fined or imprisoned, or both. It does not specify the citizenship of the person
committing espionage. 18 U.S.C. § 798(a) (2006).
53 The Espionage Act is not the only statutory authority that extends criminal
jurisdiction beyond the territories of the United States. For example, the
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act expands United States criminal
jurisdiction over foreign nationals acting under the purview of the United States,
such as military contractors. Extension of jurisdiction over foreign nationals
acting on foreign soil is not a particularly unusual possibility. See K. Elizabeth
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who publish sensitive documents would not be hindered by the fact
that the alleged crimes occurred on the Internet or in a foreign
jurisdiction.
III. JULIAN ASSANGE AND THE WIKILEAKS CONTROVERSY
A. The Intelligence Leak
In the summer of 2010, Julian Assange and fellow Internet
activists met in Iceland to decrypt sensitive military video footage,
which revealed a 2007 incident in which an American Apache
military helicopter54 fired on civilians in Iraq." Assange's project,
WikiLeaks, had been operating for years, but this was the first big
release of sensitive data, and it jettisoned Assange and WikiLeaks
into the public eye." Later, it became apparent that Assange and
his team desired more than posting only one damaging video.
Shortly after releasing the decrypted video of the military attack,
the WikiLeaks group published tens of thousands of sensitive
documents and "classified cables"" on their Web site, which
Waits, Avoiding the "Legal Bermuda Triangle": The Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act's Unprecedented Expansion of U.S. Criminal Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Nationals, 23 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 493 (2006), for a detailed
analysis of the United States' criminal jurisdiction over individuals acting in
connection with U.S. military forces.
54 Boeing: AH-64 Apache, BOEING (last visited Jan. 28, 2011),
http://www.boeing.com/rotorcraft/military/ah64d/index.htm (describing the
specifications of the AH-64A Apache helicopter used by military customers).
5 Raffi Khatchadourian, No Secrets, THE NEW YORKER, (June 7, 2010),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/06/07/100607fa-fact khatchadouria
n.
Noam Cohen and Brian Stelter, Iraq Video Brings Notice to a Web Site,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/
world/07wikileaks.html; Steve Kingstone, WikiLeaks posts video of 'US military
killings' in Iraq, BBC NEWS (Apr. 6, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/8606402.stm; Declan McCullagh, Wikileaks releases video of Iraq
journalist shooting, CNET.COM (Apr. 5, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-
13578 3-20001802-38.html?tag mncol; Iraqi journalists want probe of taped
US shooting, Fox NEWS (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/
04/06/iraqi-journalists-want-probe-taped-shooting/.
5 The "classified cables" refer to "the kinds of cables that [diplomatic] posts
send to Washington" that "involve discussions that [diplomats] had with
12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 177, 188
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incriminated not only the United States, but a host of other
countries in behind-closed-door deals and duplicitous
maneuverings."
The United States government, alarmed at the massive release
of secret diplomatic cables and military information, initially
pursued the leak among military personnel." Private Bradley
Manning, a serviceman in the U.S. Army, was arrested and
charged under military law for downloading the intelligence data
onto a digital memory stick, transferring those data to his own
computer, and sending the information to an unauthorized source.60
The purely technological transfer presented a new, tougher
problem for the United States government than previous
intelligence leaks like the belabored copying of the Pentagon
Papers in the 1970's.61
The ease of transfer and subsequent publication of tens of
thousands of documents en masse over the Internet has raised
government officials, with private citizens." The U.S. State Department feared
that release of the cables would "create tension in our relationships between our
diplomats and our friends around the world." Daily Press Briefing, Philip J.
Crowley, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of State,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2010/11/151962.htm (Nov. 24, 2010).
5 Khatchadourian, supra note 55.
59 U.S. investigations focused internally on the military to out the leakers
when the video of the Apache helicopter attack on civilian journalists was first
released. Thousands of documents related to the U.S. involvement in
Afghanistan were released on WikiLeaks, and the U.S. government then sought
to expand its criminal investigations into the WikiLeaks organization. See Phil
Stewart, WikiLeaks has more U.S. war files, Pentagon says, REUTERS (Oct. 26,
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/26/us-wikileaks-iraq-pentagon-
idUSTRE69P4S220101026.
60 Chris McGreal, US private Bradley Manning charged with leaking Iraq
killings video, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 6, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2010/jul/06/bradley-manning-charged-iraq-killings-video. For more
information about Manning's own thoughts on the ease of the digital transfer,
see David Leigh, How 250,000 US embassy cables were leaked, THE GUARDIAN
(Nov. 28, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/28/how-us-
embassy-cables-leaked.
61 See Nimmer, supra note 20; William H. Freivogel, Feds take unusual step
of subpoenaing Sterling's lawyer, ST. Louis BEACON (Jan. 21, 2011),
http://www.stlbeacon.org/issues-politics/nation/ I 07662-sterling-lawyers-
subpoena.
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concerns about the blurring line between press and leaker.62 Also,
in addition to the ease of transfer, it is possible that universal
access to such information contributes to the security threat when it
is posted online, since the recipient could be any foreign
government or terrorist organization. When news of the
intelligence leak reverberated in public, members of Congress, as
well as the Obama Administration, denounced the unauthorized
publications as the work of a terrorist." Senator Dianne Feinstein
called for prosecution of Assange specifically under the Espionage
Act.64
B. The Espionage Act and Online Media Organizations
Condemnation of Julian Assange and his WikiLeaks cohorts
progressed to prosecution efforts by the U.S. government, likely
under the Espionage Act. The actions of Assange and WikiLeaks
have raised questions about the application of the Act, a law that
now dates back nearly 100 years and contains ambiguous
references to "information respecting the national defense"'6 and
62 In his report filed when testifying before the House Judiciary Committee on
the proposed SHIELD Act, attorney Abbe Lowell said that differing
interpretations of "communication," "publication," and "use," as set forth in
§ 798, fail to realize that "digital technology and the Internet have significantly
blurred, if not entirely erased, the lines" between the three terms. Espionage Act
and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks: Hearing on H. R.
6506 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 29 (2010) (statement
of Abbe D. Lowell, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery, LLP).
63 John Bingham, WikiLeaks: Julian Assange facing US prosecution bid, says
Joe Biden, THE TELEGRAPH (Dec. 19, 2010),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8212812/WikiLeaks-
Julian-Assange-facing-US-prosecution-bid-says-Joe-Biden.html.
64 Dianne Feinstein, Prosecute Assange under the Espionage Act, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 7, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703989004575653280626335258.htm (stating that
Assange "is no journalist: He is an agitator intent on damaging our
government. . . ." and should not be given any protection under the First
Amendment).
65 18 U.S.C. § 793(a) (2006) (offering no definition of "respecting national
defense").
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"classified information."66 Vice President Joseph Biden claimed
that the U.S. is pursuing prosecution of Assange for his
involvement in the WikiLeaks acquisition and release of classified
information, but the potential charges are as of yet unclear."
Biden called Assange a "high-tech terrorist,"" drawing attention to
the Administration's interpretation of WikiLeaks' actions as a form
of technological warfare, not a form of investigative journalism.
The online publication of government secrets raises a slew of
new legal questions for the U.S. government to answer in its quest
to pin Assange with charges of espionage in connection to the
classified information stolen by Manning and the publication of
such documents on the WikiLeaks Web site.6'9 The United States
has not used the Espionage Act in the past to criminalize
publication of classified information; instead it has pursued those
who leaked the secret documents or exchanged them with the
press.70 Thus, WikiLeaks' publication of thousands of such
documents in the name of government transparency and public
disclosure requires a look at the courts' willingness to afford
WikiLeaks and similar online media organizations the same
consideration they have for traditional news institutions like The
New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Chicago Tribune.
The status of WikiLeaks as a clearinghouse of secured
documents and a publisher of such information makes it a
vulnerable target for the Espionage Act. Julian Assange's role in
the leaking and publication is in question, because although he
acted primarily as a publisher, he also may have acquired,
1 18 U.S.C. § 798(b) (defining "classified information" as "information
which ... is, for reasons of national security, specifically designated by a United
States Government Agency for limited or restricted dissemination or
distribution).
See Bingham, supra note 63.
68 Id.
69 Julian E. Barnes & Evan Perez, Assange Probe Hits Snag, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 9, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703313304576132543747598766.html?mod=WSJhpMI
DDLENexttoWhatsNewsThird.
70 Assange charges center on two women, sex, MSNBC (Dec. 8, 2010),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40551118/ns/us-news-wikileaks-in-security.
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collected, and solicited the information, which puts him in a
different position than The New York Times when it was offered
the information in the Pentagon Papers.7 1 The New York Times is
an established newspaper, while WikiLeaks is a Web site self-
proclaimed as a "non-profit media organization." 72 Scholars have
suggested that even The New York Times could have faced
prosecution under the Espionage Act for retaining, accumulating,
and discussing the potentially threatening materials in the Pentagon
Papers.
The line drawn by the courts between the leaking of
information and the publishing of information could break down
when applied to the facts of a potential U.S. suit against WikiLeaks
and Julian Assange. The U.S. Department of State sent Assange a
letter dated November 27, 2010, warning the online activist that
publishing the classified diplomatic cables would be a danger to
"innocent individuals."74 The letter also informed Assange that he
violated U.S. law merely by retaining such documents, an early
hint that the U.S. could build a criminal case against him given the
Espionage Act's prohibitions against acquiring and retaining secret
documents.75
The U.S. government, if it pursued criminal charges against
Assange, would likely allege that he violated both § 793(b) (which
makes it illegal to copy or obtain sensitive materials) and § 793(e)
(which makes it illegal for those with unauthorized possession to
communicate or transmit sensitive materials). The courts could
rule that Assange's publication of the secret documents is
protected by the First Amendment, and that publication by media
organizations would not satisfy § 793(e)'s requirement that one
i William H. Freivogel, Feds take unusual step of subpoenaing Sterling's
lawyer, ST. Louis BEACON (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.stlbeacon.org/issues-
politics/nation/107662-sterling-lawyers-subpoena.
72 W1KILEAKS, http://213.251.145.96/ (last viewed Feb. 13, 2011).
73 Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and
Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 929, 967, 1036 (1973).
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must willfully communicate, deliver, or transmit documents related
to national defense. However, as U.S. officials and scholars have
suggested, Assange and other WikiLeaks employees could be
criminally liable if they merely obtained the information from a
source known to have copied the data illegally, and had the
requisite intent or reason to believe the information could be used
to the detriment of the United States.76
If the U.S. government were to file a lawsuit against Assange,
the courts could rule that simply because WikiLeaks and Assange
himself acquired, retained, and transmitted the information, then
the organization and the individual violated the Espionage Act.
Such a ruling would, of course, depend on the requisite intent to
injure the United States' national security interests and proof that
Assange directly enabled the dissemination. While courts have
been hesitant to directly state that news organizations have
immunity from the Espionage Act by merely reporting on leaks
already made by third parties, precedent suggests that judges
would be sympathetic to WikiLeaks. In Morison, Judge Wilkinson
recognized the role of the press "to scrutinize and report on
government activity," to foster "knowledge," and to expose
government abuses of power." WikiLeaks, despite being publicly
condemned as a terrorist organization or labeling as a group of
hacker activists, gathered the secured documents and reported on
them in the interest of public disclosure. Assange and his team
preemptively contacted the U.S. Department of State to collaborate
on the thousands of documents they planned to reveal, and they
published a selection of the materials received from P.F.C.
Manning." Even The Guardian, a London-based print and online
newspaper,79 sifted through the database of classified information
and published their own selection with redactions of information
they thought might harm individuals." WikiLeaks also parsed
76 Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 73, at 967 and 1036.
77 United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1081 (4th Cir. 1988).
78 See Leigh, supra note 60.
79 The Guardian is the online version of The Observer, its sister paper. See
User FAQ, THE GUARDIAN (last visited Feb. 24, 2011),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/help/users/faq#newspaper.80 id.
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through the information like its more traditional media counterpart.
These factual parallels would likely bolster WikiLeaks' argument
before American courts that it was acting in the interests of public
disclosure and government scrutiny, even at the risk of the U.S.
government suffering embarrassment, injured diplomatic relations,
and additional threats to military activities.
C. The SHIELD Act: Congressional Reaction to WikiLeaks
The U.S. government has yet to extradite and pursue
prosecution of Julian Assange or any WikiLeaks employee as of
this writing." However, while the Justice Department is moving
cautiously, the U.S. Congress has explored new legislation to
vigorously pursue criminal leaks, making journalists and media
organizations more likely targets.82 The Securing Human
Intelligence and Enforcing Lawful Dissemination ("SHIELD") Act
was first introduced in the Senate on December 2, 2010 by Senator
John Ensign (R-NV) with support from Senator Joseph Lieberman
(I-CT)." An identical bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives on December 8, 2010.84 Both identical versions of
the bill were reintroduced in the 11 2 tlh Congress with a greater
number of co-sponsors." The WikiLeaks publication spurred
Senator Lieberman's support for the bill, because an amendment of
the Espionage Act is necessary to "give the Administration
increased flexibility to go after WikiLeaks and its founder Julian
81 On January 24, 2011, NBC News reported that Pentagon officials could not
prove a sufficient connection between Private Bradley Manning and Julian
Assange. However, the Attorney General suggested that prosecution under the
Espionage Act was not out of the question if the U.S. government could make a
case that the publication of the leaked documents was enough to constitute a
crime. See Jim Miklaszewski, NBC: U.S. can't link accused Army private to
Assange, MSNBC (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41241414/.
82 Posting of Benjamin Wittes to Lawfare Blog (Dec. 6, 2010),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/12/espionage-act-amendments/ (Dec. 6,
2010, 11:40 AM).
83 S. 4004, 111th Cong. (2010).
84 H.R. 6506, 111th Cong. (2010).
S. 315, 112th Cong. (2011) (reintroducing the SHIELD Act amendment in
the current Congress); H.R. 703, 112th Cong. (2011) (same).
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Assange.""6 The SHIELD Act builds on the existing language of
the Espionage Act, broadening the range of activities punishable
under the U.S. criminal code to include publishing the names of
human intelligence informants and disclosure of information that
poses a security threat to the United States.87 Specifically, the law
amends only § 798 (previously recognized to protect a narrow
category of communications intelligence and cryptography) to
criminalize publication of "classified information"" that benefits a
"transnational threat."8 9
The bill is worded such that the U.S. government can more
successfully prosecute Assange if his activities continue. Given
the past treatment of sections of the Espionage Act in courts, it is
likely that the U.S. government would rely on § 793 to pursue
Assange or similar "high-tech terrorists" prior to passage of the
SHIELD Act. If the SHIELD Act were enacted as currently
introduced, the explicit criminality of publication already
enshrined in § 798, as contrasted with the more nebulous
provisions regarding publication in § 793, would enable the
government to attack the WikiLeaks publications more easily
under § 798. Testifying before the House Committee on the
Judiciary in a hearing for the SHIELD Act, former Assistant
Attorney General Kenneth Wainstein emphasized the serious threat
posed by WikiLeaks:
[WikiLeaks and similar online organizations are] a threat that will only
get more dangerous with the advance of enabling technology and with
86 Bipartisan Legislation Goes After WikiLeaks by Amending Espionage Act,
JOE LIEBERMAN: UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR CONNECTICUT (Dec. 2, 2010),
http://1ieberman.senate.gov/index.cfm/news-events/news/2010/12/bipartisan-
legislation-goes-after-wikileaks-by-amending-espionage-act.
87 S. 4004, 111th Cong. (2010).
8 Id (defining "classified information" as "information which ... is, for
reasons of national security, specifically designated by a United States
Government Agency for limited or restricted dissemination or distribution").
89 Id. (defining "transnational threat" as "(A)ny transnational activity
(including international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the delivery systems for such weapons, and
organized crime) that threatens the national security of the United States; or (B)
any individual or group that engages in an activity referred to in subparagraph
(A).").
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the realization after these recent leaks that it takes so little to strike such
a grandiose blow against government secrecy-nothing more than a
computer, access to a disaffected government employee with a
clearance, and a willingness to compromise our nation's interests and
security. 90
As a nascent media organization, WikiLeaks fails to show the
same self-governance as a newspaper like The New York Times or
The Washington Post, or even The Guardian, institutions that risk
public backlash and lawsuits if they publish overly sensitive
national security information that is not essential to government
transparency. As precedent shows, the judiciary and legislature
have accepted the status quo balance between freedom of the press
and national security with respect to the publication of leaked
classified documents. However, the burgeoning area of online
media adds another outlet for leaks in a form that might lack
internal policing procedures to reduce the threat of publishing truly
dangerous information. WikiLeaks, unlike its inked
contemporaries, functions as a digital clearinghouse willing to post
information online without the same degree of screening for
dangerous information. If WikiLeaks fails to convince legislators
that it is a legitimate news organization acting in the public interest
to examine hidden government activities, then Congress will likely
pass the SHIELD Act or similar amendments that enable the
government to prosecute its publications.
Such amendments, however, broaden the scope of the criminal
activities without properly defining what should be considered a
media organization. Such a legislative move endangers not only
the activities of online media but also the traditional press. Courts
have long respected the line between publishing and
communicating leaked information, but judges here focused on the
legislative history of the Espionage Act and Congress' decision to
exclude the word "publish" from the commonly used § 793. With
the expansion of language in § 798, the United States would likely
use § 798, once narrowly constructed to apply to particular secret
9o Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by
WikiLeaks: Hearing on H.R. 6506 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 42-43 (2010) (statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein, Partner, O'Melveny &
Myers, LLP).
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communications and codes, to pursue both leaks of "classified
information" that present a "transnational threat" and publication
of such leaks. Inclusion of the new statutory language in a section
of the Espionage Act that explicitly criminalizes publication of
restricted information would not only increase the scrutiny of
disclosures by WikiLeaks and other Internet-based organizations
but also the publications of the very members of the press the
courts have protected in the past.
IV. CONCLUSION
Application of the Espionage Act of 1917 has changed since its
original passage during World War I. Adapting to fit the need to
protect national security during wartime and peacetime, the Act
applies to both American citizens and foreign nationals and
extends beyond the physical borders of the United States. The
advent of computer technology, and perhaps even more
importantly, the Internet, has created newer and faster modes of
intelligence acquisition, transfer, theft, communication, and
publication. Courts have consistently perceived a line between the
person who leaks intelligence that threatens national security and
the person or institution that publishes the leaked intelligence that
threatens national security. The balance between national security
and freedom of the press has been respected, but when modem
technologies blur the line between leaking and publishing
classified data the balance can no longer be so maintained.
The recent WikiLeaks controversy has highlighted the impact
of technology on application of the Espionage Act to publication of
sensitive government information. As a foreign national, Assange
could still be subject to prosecution if the U.S. government could
prove he acted as a communicator of dangerous national security
information rather than as a traditional member of the press. The
multiple technological innovations that enabled the massive
transfer and publication of the secret documents make the Assange
situation an interesting case study for the future of the Espionage
Act in a highly interconnected and networked world. The
introduction of the SHIELD Act in Congress, regardless of its
future passage, indicates that the legislature is willing to expand
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the concept of espionage, potentially including publication even by
journalistic institutions, without waiting for decisions from the
judiciary regarding whether technologies will mean shifting the
fulcrum toward freedom of the press.
Even if Julian Assange is not prosecuted, he could represent a
future model of sharing classified information via the Internet,
especially when the individual acquiring the secure documents
directly posts the information online. In that scenario the
individual could be found criminally liable under the Espionage
Act, even with the courts' interpretations of a safe haven for the
press. Now, web-based technology has blurred the line so that the
Supreme Court must be careful to distinguish acquisition of
classified data with the role of a publisher-to shed light on the
secret dealings of governments to increase transparency for their
citizenry. Members of Congress have introduced the SHIELD Act
to draw a sharper line, but that bright line comes at the expense of
freedom of the press. While Congress is right to address
ambiguities in the Espionage Act, the SHIELD Act proposes
potentially sweeping changes that signal future targeting of online
media organizations not typically regarded as journalistic
enterprises. Instead of reacting too quickly to the WikiLeaks
release of classified documents, Congress should reevaluate the
existing sections of the Espionage Act and fashion language that
precisely defines the publication of such information and
establishes the limit of criminality once the information has been
leaked in order to protect public disclosure. The SHIELD Act
offers no such clarification and would instead broaden the type of
sensitive information illegal to communicate and would arm the
U.S. government with a tool that would restrict both traditional and
newer digital media organizations from exposing government
actions.
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